The objectives of this paper it to examine the association between nonaudit service fees and accrual earnings management that take place during the IPO year. While nonaudit service fees and accrual earnings management has been examined in a number of settings, to date, there has been no work that analyses this association for IPO firm. The findings of this paper find evidence for clients of low quality audit firms that nonaudit service fees are positively associated with accrual earnings management during the IPO year, suggesting that nonaudit service fees compromise auditor independence.
Introduction
The impact of non-audit services (NAS) on auditor independence has received an increased interest in recent decades due to the importance of financial reporting quality and its consequences on the capital market participants. Audit firms have an important role to ensure the integrity of their clients' financial reporting and, therefore, the size of NAS may lead auditors to turn a blind eye to opportunistic accounting practices by their clients. In line with this view, prior research has investigated this relationship and found evidence that NAS are associated with opportunistic activities such as earnings management activities e.g. Frankel et al. (2002) . Given the importance of this issue, regulators and policy makers have started to apply many reforms for their regulations and rules to reduce the impact of NAS on auditor independence. More recently, the European Union (EU) has issued a new legislation to reform the audit market with the EU 8 . Specifically, in December 2013 the European Commission, Parliament and Council of Ministers agreed on draft legislation that has a cap on the total amount of NAS that can be charged and a list of prohibited NAS that auditors should not provide to their clients within the EU. The EU Parliament was voted on the legislation in April 2014 and it came into force in mid-2014. Despite this new reform on the audit environment in the EU, many other countries in this world still allow the audit firms to provide the NAS for their clients without any restrictions. 8 See the following link for more details on the NAS issue within the EU http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO- 14-427_en.htm One of the common research settings to address whether NAS fees compromise auditors independence was by examining the association between NAS fees and accrual earnings management. Specifically, prior research find a positive association between the level of accrual-based manipulation and the level of NAS fees, suggesting that NAS fees lead to compromise auditors independence. For example, Frankel et al. (2002) and Ferguson (2004) find evidence that NAS fees are positively associated with discretionary accruals. Basioudis et al. (2008) find financially stressed firms that paid high NAS fees are less likely to receive a going-concern modified audit report. However, a few other studies find different results that questioning the view that NAS fees may lead to compromise auditor independence. For example, Lim and Tan (2008) find that non-audit fees are associated with high-quality auditing, but just for firms audited by auditor industry expertise. Krishinan et al. (2011) discuss this mixed evidence concerning the association between NAS and earnings management and refer this to two factors; economic dependence and harmful NAS (see e.g., Chung and Kallapur, 2003; Larcker and Richardson, 2004) . The economic dependence means that the auditor is financially dependent on the fees of their clients, and the harmful NAS suggests there are two types of the NAS may be provided to the client (good NAS vs. harmful NAS).
Despite this mixed evidence on the impact of NAS on auditor independence (through the use of earnings management), no research to date has examined this association based on the Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) setting. This paper therefore aims to explore further whether NAS may compromise auditor independence by focusing on earnings management activities that take place during the IPO in the United Kingdom (UK) for several reasons. First, the IPO represents a unique setting to address such issue due to the strong incentives to manage reported earnings upward (e.g., Teoh et Wongsunwai, 2012) , and due to the high levels of NAS fees that charged during the IPO year. Second, the IPO is an important event in the firms' life cycle where auditors play a vital role not to ensure the integrity of the financial reporting but also to the success of the offering. Specifically, the IPO firm is a private firm in the early stage of their life cycle that just went public and, therefore, the expertise and the knowledge of their auditors (which provided through the NAS) can contribute positively to the whole process of the IPO. Further, in the UK the Companies Regulations (disclosure of Auditor Remuneration) require listed companies to disclose the amount of audit and NAS fees in their annual reports 9 . This disclosure in turn allows differentiating between audit and NAS fees to examine their impact on manager opportunistic practices such as earnings management activities.
Overall, it is expected that the size of NAS that auditors provide to their clients during the IPO would be more than the size of audit service 10 . Thus, whether this large amount of NAS fees that is paid to the auditor during the IPO would lead to conflict of interest is still an interesting research question.
By examining a sample of 548 IPO firms that went public on the London Stock Exchanges (the UK Main Market and the Alternative Investment Market [AIM]) between 1998 and 2008, the results show evidence that NAS compromise auditor independence. Specifically, after splitting the IPOs sample based on quality of the audit firms, the results show for IPO clients of low quality audit firms (non-big N) that NAS fees are positively associated with the level of discretionary accruals during the IPO. While for the clients of high quality audit firms (big N) the results show no evidence on the association between NAS fees and earnings management. Big N audit firms are expected to provide high quality auditing during the IPO given the high probability of reputation damage and litigation risk that may result from earnings manipulation. Thus, findings of this paper support the new legislation that just is approved by the EU to have a cap on the amount of NAS fees that can be charged by the auditors, and the new restriction on a list of NAS that should not be provided by the auditors to their clients.
Further, the findings contribute to literature by adding new evidence on the association between NAS and accrual earnings 9 For more details see http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2011/2198/pdfs/uksiem_20 112198_en.pdf 10 For example, in our sample over 80% of the IPO firms paid more on the NAS fees as compared to the audit fees for their auditors. management by examining a new setting (the IPO setting), which has received little attention by prior research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and presents our hypotheses development. Section 3 discusses data and empirical methodology. Sections 4 discuss empirical evidence on the association between NAS and accrual earnings management during the IPO. Section 5 presents the additional analysis. Section 6 concludes. (Titman and Trueman, 1986; Brau and Fawcett, 2006) . This is due to the fact that high quality auditors consider the potential litigation risks that are associated with the IPO event and, therefore, they are expected to provide high quality audits that overall help to reduce information asymmetry and IPO underpricing (Balvers et al. 1988; Beatty 1989; Datar et al. 1991; Hogan, 1997) . However, not all IPO firms can afford to pay the fees of high quality audit firms and, therefore, they may hire low quality audit firms.
In line with the above view, prior research finds consistent evidence that IPO firms engage in earnings management to manage reported earnings upward at the end of the IPO year to meet different incentives (e.g., Friedlan, 1994; Teoh et al. 1998a; Gramlich and Sorensen, 2004; Morsfield and Tan, 2006) . Teoh et al. (1998) for example discuss these incentives and indicate that managerial shares selling post-IPO, avoiding an abnormal reduction in stock prices, executive remunerations, and earnings forecast are the most common incentives to manage earnings during the IPO year. Prior research also shows that IPO firms have strong incentives to hire high quality auditors to send positive signals about the offer to outsiders (Titman and Trueman, 1986; Brau and Fawcett, 2006) . This is due to the fact that high quality auditors (big N) are expected to provide high-quality audits to avoid any future litigation risks and to protect their reputation in the capital market (DeAngelo, 1981; Francis and Krishnan, 1999 
Nonaudit Service Fees and Accrual Earnings Management around IPOs
The main objective of this study is to examine whether the NAS fees are associated with accrual earnings management that take place during the IPO year. An IPO firm is a private firm with limited information that is mostly in the early stage of its life cycle, and that suffer for lack of knowledge and expertise as compared to other mature listed firms. Therefore, the NAS that provided by the audit firms would play an effective role to help and advice the IPO firm at this stage, and even the NAS fees that are charged during the IPO would be much higher than the charged audit service fees at the same period.
As a result, how audit firms would react to any opportunistic earnings management that undertaken by their clients during the IPO year, may depend on two factors; the quality of auditors and the size of NAS fees. On the one hand, high quality audit firms are expected to be economically dependent from their clients and, therefore, provide high quality monitoring to any earnings management practices, ignoring the size of NAS fees. On the other hand, low quality audit firms are usually small audit firms and therefore economically dependent on the NAS fees that are paid by their clients. Such financial dependence may lead these low quality audit firms to turn a blind eye on any earnings management activities that take place during the IPO. Thus, for low quality audit firms it is expected that NAS fees will compromise the auditor independence, which may lead their IPO clients to engage in a higher level of earnings management to manage reported earnings upward during the IPO, notably the IPO firms have strong incentives to do so. Frankel et al. (2002) focus on the association between earnings management and audit and nonaudit fees. By examining a sample of 3,074 US firms, Frankel et al. (2002) find evidence that audit fees are negatively associated with discretionary accruals, suggesting that the higher audit fees imply higher audit quality and, this in turn, leads to a lower level of accrual-based manipulation. However, they find nonaudit fees are positively associated with discretionary accruals and small earnings surprises, suggesting that non-audit fees might compromise auditor independence. Further, Sohn (2011) examines the association between audit fees and real earnings management and finds evidence that audit fees are positively associated with real activities-based manipulation, confirming recent evidence (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Chi et al, 2011) on the positive association between enhanced audit quality and real earnings management activities. In addition, Basioudis et al. (2008) find evidence that the issuance of going-concern modified audit report is positively associated with the level of audit fees for financially stressed firms in the UK. While for financially stressed firms that paid high non-audit fees Basioudis et al. (2008) find evidence that these firms are less likely to receive a going-concern modified audit report.
11 Ferguson et al. (2004) examine UK listed firms over the period 1996-1998 and find similar evidence that NAS are associated positively with earnings management. They examine different proxies of NAS and find their results are consistent, confirming the view that NAS fees compromise auditor independence. Although prior research has focused on examining the association between NAS fees and accrual-based earnings management, no research to date has examined whether NAS are associated with accrual earnings management during the IPO.
Therefore, and based on the previous discussion, it is expected for the clients of low quality audit firms that the NAS fees to be positively associated with the level of accrual earnings management during the IPO year, suggesting that NAS fees compromise low quality audit firm independence . The main hypothesis is as follows:
H1: For IPO clients of low quality audit firms, the levels of NAS fees are positively associated with the level of accrual earnings during the IPO year.
Data and research methods

Sample Construction
The sample consists of 548 IPO firms that went public on either the Main market or the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) of the London Stock Exchange over the period 1998-2008. 12 IPOs to be included into the sample, they must have the necessary data to estimate accrual earnings management, available prospectuses, and other required data for the control variables. Due to differences in the accrual generating process all 11 In contrast with the evidence of Frankel et al. (2002) 
Variable Measurement
Measuring Accrual-Based Earnings Management
The estimation process involves two stages. First, normal accruals are estimated for the control sample (all non-IPO UK firms over the period 1998-2008) for each year-industry group. This approach aims to control for any changes in economic conditions that may lead to bias in the estimation (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994, Kasznik, 1999 The following model therefore is used to estimate normal accruals for all non-IPO UK firms:
Where TA i,t is total accruals that are defined as earnings before extraordinary items minus operating cash flows; AvAssets i,t is the sum of total assets at the beginning and at the end of the year divided by 2; ∆SALES i,t is the change in sales during a year; PPE i,t is the gross value of property, plant and equipment ;
and ROA i,t is return on assets. All variables are scaled by average total assets.
In the second stage, normal accruals (NA i,t ) for the IPO sample are calculated using the estimated coefficients α0, β1, β2, β3 and β4 from equation (1) above, and as follows,
Where ∆ REC i,t is the change in receivables during the year scaled by average total assets. Finally, Discretionary accruals (DA i,t ) are calculated as total accruals minus the fitted normal as follows, Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of key variables for the sample at the IPO. Table 1 shows that the average total assets of IPO firms prior to go public is £57.24 million, the median is £4.54 million, the standard deviation is £273.78 million, the minimum amount is £0.07 million, and the maximum amount is £1969.10 million. This large difference in total assets values is due to the fact that the sample comprises very small IPO firms (AIM market IPOs) and very large firms (Main market IPOs). The AIM market is designed to fit the needs of small, growing IPO firms.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Consistent with this, Table 1 shows that the mean market capitalization for IPO firms is £113.87 million and the median is £25.91 million with a range from £1.44 million to £2,020.68 million. Table 1 also shows that the money raised by IPO firms ranges from £0.14 million to £1499.85 million with a mean of £43.90 million and a median of £7.31 million. With regards to the net income of IPO firms, Table 1 shows that the operating performance (net income) for IPO firms on average £2.03 million with a standard deviation of £25.89 million and a median of £-0.01 million. The minimum and the maximum amount of net income range from £-124.10 million to approximately £398 million. [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . Total assets are the beginning of period total assets; net income is at the ending of period net income; market value is the market capitalization for IPO firms immediately after the listing; money raised is the offer amount of the IPO. NAS is the nonaudit service fees. NAS and audit fees are at the ending of period. Total assets and net income are obtained from the WorldScope database; market value and money raised are obtained from the London Stock Exchange website; NAS and audit fees are obtained from Fame database. Table 2 Table 2 (Panel B) shows similar statistics that the Business Services industry accounts for more than 30% of the sample. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for all the variables in our regression models for the pooled sample. The results are interpreted based on the mean values. Table 3 shows that the mean (median) discretionary accruals is positive 0.02 (0.01) 13 . Table  3 also shows that 47% of the IPO sample is audited by big-N audit firms, which suggests the IPO subsamples are an approximately equal ( big-N Vs nonbig-N IPO clients), which provide conservative test for the association between NAS and accrual earnings management. In addition, Table 3 shows that 75% of the IPO sample is listed on the AIM market. The AIM 13 The unreported results show that the mean (median) values of discretionary accruals are and statistically significant at the 5% (1%) level, suggesting that IPO firm exhibit a level of accrual-based manipulation during the IPO year. This is consistent with prior research that fins IPO firms engage in high level of earnings management during the offer year. The results are not reported as the focus of this paper on examining the association between NAS and accrual earnings management around the IPO. market is designed to fit the needs of small, growing IPO firms as compared to the Main market listing. Discretionary accruals is discretionary accruals, NAS is the nonaudit service fees, TotalFees is the total of NAS and audit fees, Big-N =1 if the firm is audited by big-N audit firm and 0 otherwise, Ln(MK) is the natural logarithm of market value, BM is the book-tomarket ratio calculated as the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity, Ln(1+age) is the natural logarithm of 1+ IPO firm age where the IPO firm's age is calculated as the difference between the founding date of the IPO firm and the date of its IPO, Capex growth is capital expenditure growth which is computed as capital expenditure for the IPO year minus previous year scaled by total assets the year prior, Leverage is total debt divided by total assets in the year prior to the IPO, (AudTenure) is a continues variable that measures the cumulative number of years of the auditor-client relationship, Loss = 1 if the firm reported a loss during the IPO year and 0 otherwise, ROA is return on assets measured as earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets in the year prior to the IPO, , SEO=1 if the firms issue seasoned equity offering during the IPO year and 0 otherwise, AIM= 1 if the firms listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) and 0 otherwise, VC= 1 if the firm is backed by a venture capitalist and 0 otherwise, and Underwriter=1 if the firm is underwritten by a prestigious underwriter and 0 otherwise, Chrm/CEO =1 if the chairman of the board and the CEO is the same director and zero otherwise, OutDirectors is measured as the percentage of outside directors on the board, BrdSize is the number of directors on the board.
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Results -NAS and Accrual Earnings Management
To test whether NAS fees are associated with accrual earnings management during the IPO year, the following model is estimated for the IPO sub-samples (IPOs audited by big N sample vs. IPO audited nonbig N sample): 
Where (DA i,t ) is discretionary accruals, the proxy of accrual-earnings management, during the IPO year and (NASProx) represents the different proxies of NAS fees, namely NAS-Rank and Ln(NAS). NASRank is the percentile rank of the percentage of nonaudit fees to the total audit fees, while Ln(NASfees) is the natural logarithm of nonaudit service fees during the IPO year 14 .
14 The percentile rank of all variables (dependent and independent) is used in the regression models to avoid the influence of outliers (e. In order to control for grow opportunities the model includes book-to-market ratio (BM); calculated as the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. IPO firm age [ln(1+age)] calculated as the natural logarithm of 1+IPO firm age, where firm age is calculated as the difference between the founding date and the date of its IPO. Capital expenditure growth (CapexGrowth) computed as capital expenditure during the IPO year minus the capital expenditure in the previous year scaled by total assets in the year prior to the IPO year (e.g., Rangan, 1998 is added into the model; which is a continuos variable that measures the cumulative number of years of the auditor-client relationshship. In addition, leverage ratio (Leverage) measured as total debt t /total assets t-1 to control for the level of debt, as firms with high levels of debt have a higher probabilty to manage earnings either upward or downard (see e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994).
The model also controls for profitability by adding two variables; loss (Loss) is a dummy variable that equalling 1 for firms that have reported a loss and zero otherwise; while ROA (ROA) as measured as return on assets (e.g., Kothari Financial intermediaries are also found to play a significant role to monitor earnings management activities. For example, Morsfield and Tan (2006) , Lee and Masulis (2011) and Wongsunwai (2012) find that IPO firms that have a presitgous underwriter or backed by venture capitalists have a lower level of estimation bias of the coefficient. Thus, the percentile rank is used for both dependent and independent variables. earnings management activites and, therefore, the model includes two control variables (VC) and (Underwriter). Venture capitalist (VC) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the IPO firms backed by venture capitalists and zero otherwise, and (Underwriter) a dummy variable equalling 1 if the IPO firms have high profile underwriters and zero otherwise 15 . Finally, the model controls for the governance structure of IPO firms due to its constraining role on the use of earnings management activities (for more details see Klein, 2002; Osma, 2008 ; amongst others). The governance proxies are as follows; Chairman/CEO duality (Chrm/CEO) is a dummy variable equalling 1 if the chairman of the board and the CEO is the same director and zero otherwise; outside directors (OutDirectors) is measured as the percentage of outside directors on the board, and board size (BrdSize) is the number of directors on the board. The model also includes controls for industry (IND) and year (Year) effects. Table 4 reports the results for IPO firms audited by low quality audit firms, and presents evidence that NAS fees are positively associated with accrual earnings management. Specifically, the results show a positive coefficient of 0.150 (p<0.05) on NAS-Rank in the discretionary accruals regression. This evidence suggests for IPO firms audited by low quality firms that firms who pay high NAS fees have a higher level of accrual earnings management. This in turn is consistent with the view that NAS fees compromise auditor independence. Further, the results show similar evidence when using the second proxy of nonaudit service fees, namely the natural logarithm of nonaudot service fees. The results show a positive coefficient of 0.213 (p<0.05) on Ln(NAS) in the discretionary accruals regression.
16 Table 5 reports the results for IPO firms audited by high quality audit firms and shows no evidence on the association between NAS fees and accrual earnings management during the IPO year. Specifically, the results show negative coefficients of -0.016 on NAS-Rank and -0.010 on Ln(NAF) in the discretionary accrual regressions, but they are statistically insignificant. This evidence is consistent with Alhadab et al. (2013a) that high quality auditors constrain accruals manipulation around IPOs 15 Prestigious underwriters are those global investment banks as defined by Derrien and Kecskes (2007) , while venture capitalist are those investors who hold more than 3% of a firm's shares and appear in the list of venture capitalists provided by the British Venture Capitalist Association. Specifically, data are collected from the prospectuses about all the shareholders who hold more than 3% of the total shares and then a shareholder's name is matched with a list of venture capitalists, which is obtained from the British Venture Capitalist Association. 16 The analysis is also repeated by adding the audit fees as a control variable into the model. The unreported results show similar evidence to those reported in Table 4 . 0.130 Note: *, **, *** Denote 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels, respectively. This table reports the regression of accrual earnings management measures on NAS fess proxies for IPO firms audited by low quality audit firms, and other associated control variables. All models include year and industry dummies to control for time and industry effects, and robust t-statistics (appear in parentheses). All variables are previously defined.
In summary, the results in Tables 4 and 5 confirm our hypothesis for IPO firms audited by low quality audit firms that NAS fees are positively associated with the level of accrual earnings management during the IPO year.
Additional analysis
Current Discretionary Accruals and NAF Fees
For robustness this paper also examines the association between NAF and discretionary current accruals rather than total accruals. Current accruals are defined as the difference between the change in noncash current assets and change in operating current liabilities (Teoh et al., 1998; Morsfield and Tan, 2006) . The unreported results show similar evidence to those reported in Table 4 , confirming that NAS fees compromise auditor independence for IPO firms audited by low quality audit firms. Specifically, discretionary current accruals are found to be positively associated with level of NAS fees just for IPO firms audited by low quality audit firms. 0.170 Note: *, **, *** Denote 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels, respectively. This table reports the regression of accrual earnings management on NAS fess proxies for IPO firms audited by high quality audit firms, and other associated control variables. All models include year and industry dummies to control for time and industry effects, and robust t-statistics (appear in parentheses). All variables are previously defined.
Real Earnings Management and NAS
This paper also examines the association between real earnings management activities and NAS fees. Recent research shows that IPO firms also engage in real activities in addition to accruals manipulation to manage earnings upward during the IPO year (e.g., Alhadab et al. 2015) . Thus, two proxies of real activities are examined; sales-based (abnormal cash flows from operations) and discretionary expensesbased (abnormal discretionary expenses) manipulations. Sales-based manipulation is conducted through offering more price discounts and/or more lenient credit terms (see Roychowdhury, 2006) , and can lead to lower levels of cash flows from operations. While discretionary expenses represent the sum of R&D, advertising expenses, and selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A). Reducing discretionary expenses in the current period will boost reported earnings in the current period. (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010) . The unreported results show no evidence that real earnings management activities are associated with level NAS fees during the IPO.
One Pooled IPOs Sample
The analysis is also repeated by using one pooled IPOs sample rather two sub-samples (IPO clients of Big N vs. IPO clients of non-big N). Specifically, the model is re-estimated for the whole IPOs sample by adding a new interaction term between NAS proxies and Big N dummy as follows: (5) Where Big N is a dummy variable equalling 1 if the firm is audited by big-N audit firm and 0 otherwise, all other variables are previously defined. The unreported results show similar evidence to those reported by Tables 4 and 5 that a higher level of NAS fees are associated with a higher level of accrual earnings management for IPOs audited by low quality firms. Specifically, the unreported results show that for every 10% increase in the NAS fees, discretionary accruals are 1.32% higher for IPOs audited by low quality audit firms. This evidence in turn confirms the main findings of this paper that NAF compromise auditor independence.
Conclusions
This paper examines whether NAS fees are associated with accrual earnings management during the IPO. The results show evidence for IPO firms audited by low quality auditors that NAS fees are positively associated with a higher level of accrual earnings management, suggesting that NAS fees compromise auditor independence. In addition, this paper examines several proxies of NAS fees and accrual earnings management and finds consistent evidence on the association between NAS fees and accrual earnings management. This evidence suggests that high quality audit firms are more concerned about damaging their reputation or/and any future litigation risk and, therefore, they provide high quality auditing for their IPO clients (see e.g., Alhadab et al. 2013a ). While for low quality audit firms, it seems they are economically dependent on their clients' fees and, therefore, they are turning a blind eye on opportunistic accrual earnings management that takes place during the IPO year.
Overall, the findings show that NAS fees compromise auditor independence around IPOs. The findings of this chapter, therefore, potentially have implications for the policy makers in the EU who just have issued a new legislation, to reform the audit market with the EU, that to have a cap on the total amount of NAS that can be charged and a list of prohibited NAS that auditors should not provide to their clients within the EU.
